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Abstract 
The economic crisis affecting the industrialised countries in recent years has been singular 
given its intensity, complexity and the difficulties in overcoming it. The aim of this paper is to 
analyse the determinants behind the crisis that have made it deeper and longer in Spain than 
in previous instances, and which have meant that there are significant obstacles to emerging 
from recession. Spanish EMU membership is a crucial aspect for consideration, as  
it contributes both to explaining the build-up of imbalances in the expansion and to 
conditioning the nature of the adjustment in the crisis, given that the range of economic 
policy instruments is significantly narrower in EMU. The macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances accumulated in the high-growth phase (the real estate boom, excess debt and 
the loss in competitiveness), which are all closely interlinked, were factors of vulnerability. But 
even apparently sounder fundamentals on other fronts, such as the budgetary and labour 
market situation, saw their weaknesses exposed in the crisis. The experience over the past 
four years allows some lessons to be drawn on the external sector, the real estate market, 
fiscal policy and the labour market. These lessons point in particular to the need to avoid 
complacency in economic policy management in boom periods and to the urgency of 
adapting the structure of goods and factor markets and the behaviour of economic agents in 
Spain to the requirements imposed by membership of a monetary union. 
Keywords: Spanish economy, EMU, economic crisis, competitiveness, real estate market, debt. 
JEL classification: E60, E65, F32, G01, H12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
La crisis económica que ha afectado a los países industrializados en los últimos años ha sido 
singular por su intensidad, complejidad y por las dificultades para su superación. El objetivo de 
este trabajo es analizar los factores que han determinado que la crisis haya adquirido en 
España una profundidad y duración superiores a las de episodios anteriores y que la salida  
de la recesión esté encontrando obstáculos significativos. La pertenencia de España a la UEM 
es un aspecto crucial a considerar, pues contribuye tanto a explicar la acumulación de 
desequilibrios en la expansión como a condicionar la naturaleza del ajuste en la crisis, dado 
que la batería de instrumentos de política económica se ha reducido significativamente. Los 
desequilibrios macroeconómicos y financieros acumulados en la etapa de alto crecimiento 
(boom inmobiliario, exceso de endeudamiento y pérdida de competitividad), todos ellos 
estrechamente interrelacionados, representaban factores de vulnerabilidad, pero, incluso los 
fundamentos aparentemente más sólidos en otros ámbitos, como en el caso de la situación 
presupuestaria y del mercado laboral, han mostrado sus debilidades en la crisis. La experiencia 
a lo largo de los últimos cuatro años permite extraer algunas lecciones en relación con el 
sector exterior, el mercado inmobiliario, la política fiscal y el mercado de trabajo, que alertan, 
en particular, sobre la necesidad de evitar la complacencia en la gestión de la política 
económica en las etapas de auge y sobre la urgencia de adaptar en España la estructura de 
los mercados de bienes y factores y el comportamiento de los agentes a los requisitos que 
impone la pertenencia a una unión monetaria. 
Palabras claves: Economía española, UEM, crisis económica, competitividad, mercado 
inmobiliario, endeudamiento. 
Códigos JEL: E60, E65, F32, G01, H12. 
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1 Introduction 
Since 2007 the world economy has undergone a phase of marked instability. This has been 
characterised by successive shocks, feedback effects between the financial and productive 
sectors, a rapid deterioration in many countries’ fiscal position, the difficulties of many of them 
in creating jobs once more and, lastly, the worsening euro area sovereign debt crisis. Such 
factors are all undoubtedly making the pace of exit from the recession slower than initially 
expected and are heightening uncertainty considerably, especially in Europe.  
The Spanish economy has been much affected by these developments, as the 
imbalances accumulated in the boom period made it particularly vulnerable to changes in 
macroeconomic and financial conditions, and in expectations about the continuity of the 
upturn. The international financial crisis precipitated the correction of the real estate and 
private-sector debt excesses marking the high-growth phase which preceded the recession. 
The deterioration of the macroeconomic scenario and, most particularly, in employment bore 
most adversely on public finances and on the position of financial institutions whose balance 
sheets showed greater exposure to real estate risk.1 Spain went into recession in 2008 Q2 
and remained there until 2010 Q1, when a modest recovery ensued that came unstuck in the 
second half of 2011, as the sovereign debt crisis heightened and spread to an increasingly 
large number of countries.   
Evidently, the high degree of synchrony of the crisis at the international level and the 
additional complications that the euro area crisis entails, affecting the Spanish economy in 
particular, are hampering the recovery. Admittedly, too, the absorption of the macroeconomic 
imbalances generated in Spain during the expansionary phase is influencing the path of 
emergence from the crisis.2 But it is worth asking whether other factors linked to the 
insufficient degree of adaptation to the macroeconomic stability that EMU membership 
requires — and which were, in part, responsible for these imbalances — hinder or delay  
the resumption of a sounder growth path.   
The aim of this paper is to review the factors which have made the crisis deeper and 
longer in Spain than in previous instances, and which have meant there are significant 
obstacles to emerging from recession. The article takes a selective approach to this matter, 
focusing on macroeconomic developments and on non-financial economic policies. Within 
this group of issues, particular attention is paid to developments that have acted as catalysts 
of the recession or of the subsequent adjustment, or that shed light on the effective 
possibilities of stabilisation by means of the economic policies implemented. In this respect, 
Spanish EMU membership is a crucial aspect for consideration, since it contributes both to 
explaining the build-up of imbalances during the expansion and to conditioning the nature of 
the adjustment during the crisis. Finally, mention should be made of the enormous uncertainty 
still clouding the outlook for the Spanish and European economies more than four years after 
the international financial crisis broke, in light of the forceful strains prevailing on financial 
markets and the doubts surrounding the outcome of the sovereign debt crisis. Such 
uncertainty naturally restricts the prospective nature of the analysis that follows, one which 
mostly turns on the lessons that may be drawn from the experience of recent years.  
                                                                          
1 An exhaustive analysis of the channels through which the international financial crisis spread can be found in Banco de 
España (2009). A detailed analysis of the imbalances that built up during the upturn is given in Estrada et al (2009). 
2 On this matter, see Banco de España (2010), Malo de Molina (2010) and Suárez (2011).  
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To this end, the first section reviews the stylised facts of the latest contractionary 
cycle in Spain, comparing it with the crises of recent decades. The determinants of the deep-
seated recession and of the subsequent economic adjustment are then examined, while the 
fourth section seeks to draw some lessons from the crisis regarding the external sector,  
the real estate market, fiscal policy and the labour market. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.   
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2 Stylised facts of the periods of contraction (2008-2009) and stagnation  
(2010-2011) 
The economic crisis affecting many of the industrialised countries in recent years has been 
singular given its intensity, widespread scope, complexity and the difficulties in overcoming it. 
In this respect, Spain, which is one of the countries that experienced a most marked 
expansion in the previous period, now stands out for its heavy fall in employment, for the 
difficulties the recovery faces and for the greater risks posed by a double-dip recession. 
Some of these matters merit greater attention. 
2.1  The contractionary cycle: 2008-2009 
GDP began to fall in Spain in 2008 Q3 and continued to diminish over the rest of 2008 
and throughout 2009, making for six consecutive quarters of declines. In cumulative 
terms, that meant a decline in the level of output of around 5 pp3 (see Chart 1). The 
employment adjustment has been virulent and protracted (the decline in employment 
began in early 2008 and continued apace in late 2011), while productivity has followed 
the same countercyclical pattern as in previous recessionary episodes. In terms of 
components, the adjustment in activity was centred on national demand, which fell by  
8 pp to end-2009, with cumulative declines of more than 5 pp in private consumption,  
29 pp in investment in equipment and 18 pp in investment in construction. As a result, 
imports also fell sharply, by more than 20 pp in cumulative terms. Although exports were 
impacted by global trade grinding to a halt and fell by 11 pp, net external demand 
cushioned the adverse impact of the decline in national demand on activity due to lower 
imports. On the supply side, the most significant fall was in value added in industry  
(15 pp) and construction (9 pp), whereas this variable hardly fell in services, as non-
market services offset the 4 pp fall in market services.   
The scale of the contraction in 2008 and 2009 did not differ greatly from that in the 
main European countries. At the trough of the cycle, Germany and Italy had lost more than 
6 pp of their pre-crisis level of output, while in France the related loss was only 3.5 pp. In 
this comparison, Spain stood out as the country that underwent the sharpest fall in its 
national demand, more than double that recorded in any of the other three economies (see 
Charts 2 and 3).   
The duration of the contraction in Spain was six quarters in the case of GDP and 
around that figure for most variables (private consumption, investment in capital goods, 
exports and imports). But the fall in investment in construction and in its value added 
continues, after 15 consecutive quarters of decline, as it does with employment (see Chart 4).  
 
 
                                                                          
3 The figures used for the characterisation of the cycle in this section are from the National Accounts Base 2000 data. 
The National Accounts Base 2008 series, which were published in mid-November 2011, do not alter the trends or the 
order of magnitude of the cyclical oscillations of the different variables. They only entail changes in the classification of 
certain variables and, in particular, in gross fixed capital formation, which particularly affects the nominal and real values 
of residential investment, and its weight in GDP, as discussed elsewhere in this paper.   
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MAIN MACROMAGNITUDES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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SOURCES: INE and ECB.
COMPARISON BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE EURO AREA: GDP AND DEMAND COMPONENTS
2008 Q2 = 100
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SOURCES: INE and ECB.
COMPARISON BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE MAIN EURO AREA COUNTRIES: GDP AND DEMAND COMPONENTS
2008 Q2 = 100
CHART 3
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The Spanish recession was more acute than those in the mid-1970s and early 
1990s4 (see Chart 5). Indeed, in the crisis that began in 1974, GDP scarcely declined, while in 
that in 1992, the cumulative decline at the bottom of the cycle was only 2 pp. Job destruction 
in the latest crisis is also approximately twice that observed in the two previous ones. Almost 
all the demand components have moved on a weaker trajectory in this recession compared 
with the previous two. The trend in investment is notable since it fell by 36% in this crisis 
compared with falls of less than 15% in 1992 and of around 6% in 1974. Under the 
investment heading, the most significant difference is in investment in construction, which had 
fallen by 40% up to 2011 Q3, compared with declines of 12% and 6% in the two previous 
recessions. Exports and imports also suffered to a greater extent in the latest recession, a 
fact related to the intensity of the adjustment in national demand and the international nature 
of the crisis in 2009, although the contribution of net external demand to GDP growth was 
greater than it was in 1992-1993. On the supply side, the three episodes analysed were 
characterised by a strong decline in gross value added (GVA) in construction, and a scant 
impact on the services branch, meaning that the differentiating factor of the latest recession is 
the significant fall-off in industrial GVA (see Chart 6).  
                                                                          
4 What are involved here are recessions which, given their magnitude and the availability of statistical information, are 
most suitable for making the pertinent comparisons. Nonetheless, both came about before the euro was in place and, 
therefore, under a very different macroeconomic regime than that currently prevailing.   
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
MAIN MACROMAGNITUDES IN RECENT CYCLES IN SPAIN
Index = 100 in the quarter prior to the beginning of the recession
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2.2 The stagnation of 2010-2011 
From 2010 Q1, when GDP began to post positive rates again, to 2011 Q3, economic activity 
picked up by scarcely 1 pp in cumulative terms. The sluggishness of the recovery is the result 
of the continuing process involving the absorption of the imbalances built up in the upturn, 
which has meant that residential investment continues to shrink and that private consumption 
is flat, given households' deleveraging needs and the uncertain economic outlook. Adding to 
these has been the fiscal consolidation process, which has required cutting public investment 
and halting the previous expansion of government consumption, as well as raising certain 
taxes. Thus, although GDP ceased to fall in late 2009, national demand has continued 
adjusting downwards since, and might continue to do so in the near future.  
Accordingly, the pick-up in expenditure in this period has been underpinned 
exclusively by external demand, with strong momentum in exports and some containment of 
imports, which has provided for a substantial correction of the current account deficit from 
10% of GDP in 2007 to an estimated 3.5% for 2011. If the external imbalance is analysed in 
terms of excess investment relative to national saving, the bulk of the adjustment has fallen on 
investment, the weight of which in 2007, with a ratio of 30.7%, was far higher (9 pp more) 
than that in the euro area. In contrast, national saving, which accounted in 2007 for 21% of 
GDP, was only 2 pp lower than the figure for the euro area and similar to that for some 
countries, such as France and Italy. In 2011, the weight of investment in GDP had fallen by 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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more than 9 pp from its peak to 21.5%, which chiefly reflects the decline in the residential 
investment component, while the national saving/GDP ratio had also fallen in this period, 
albeit to a lesser extent, by around 2.5 pp. 
As with national demand, the contraction in the labour market has not ended; 
employment has been falling for 15 quarters, with a cumulative loss of around 10% in the jobs 
existing at the start of 2008 (see Chart 7). By productive branch, employment in services has 
shown a more moderate cumulative decline, of 3%, given the weight of public-sector 
employment in this sector, where the adjustment has begun only recently. Conversely, both in 
industry (with the fall in employment standing at 19%) and in construction (where the decline 
rises to 40%) the adjustment has been most acute and, in the case of construction, has 
become sharper in recent quarters, given that the weakness of residential investment  
has been compounded by the more recent decline in public investment.  
 
 
 
The pattern of weakness is apparent in the behaviour of all the productive branches: 
the rebound in industry — underpinned essentially by the expansion of exports — is not very 
different from that seen following the recession in the early 1990s, although now the starting 
point is a lower level of output, whereas value added in construction has continued falling and 
that in services is practically flat.  
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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The intensity of the effects of the crisis in Spain has scarcely been tempered by the 
behaviour of prices and wages which, in fact, have contributed insufficiently to absorbing 
the shock and the adjustment of the economy. The average level of compensation per 
employee has increased by around 5% in cumulative terms since 2008, while over the 
same period productivity has risen by almost 10%, meaning that unit labour costs (ULCs) 
have slowed only modestly in the past three years. Admittedly, this variable increased 
during the crisis in the early 1990s, since wages were then growing more forcefully; but  
it should be taken into account that the Spanish economy was able at that time to regain 
short-term competitiveness through exchange rate depreciation (see the left-hand column 
of Chart 8). A similar picture is obtained observing the GDP deflator: in the current crisis, 
the deflator has scarcely increased, compared with a rise of almost 15% in the early 1990s. 
However, this relative price and wage moderation has far from allowed for a substantial 
improvement in competitiveness. In terms of the real effective exchange rate (REER) vis-à-
vis the developed countries, calculated on the basis of relative ULCs, a depreciation of 8% 
was brought about between 2008 and 2011, while in the 1992 crisis the figure amounted 
to 23% in a period of scarcely three years (see the right-hand column in Chart 8). In any 
event, the past experience of a large number of advanced economies and Spain's own 
experience in recent decades show that countries with a flexible exchange rate — and 
which, therefore, have the possibility of devaluing their national currency — are no more 
successful in maintaining or increasing competitiveness in the medium and long term than 
those that adopt a fixed exchange rate regime.5 
 
 
 
  
                                                                          
5 A summary of the evidence in this respect can be found in Nuño (2011). 
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
LABOUR COSTS AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE VIS-À-VIS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Index = 100 in the quarter prior to the beginning of the recession
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3 Determinants of the crisis and of the macroeconomic adjustment in Spain  
The intensity of the effects of the economic crisis in Spain and the sluggishness in exiting  
the crisis are related to the scale of the imbalances accumulated and to the virulence of the 
shocks undergone, including most notably the protracted euro area sovereign debt crisis, 
which is giving rise to powerful contractionary effects on financing conditions and on 
confidence. Furthermore, however, the adjustment phase is being influenced by certain 
idiosyncratic developments in the Spanish economy, whether because of its exposure to 
shocks that have affected it asymmetrically compared with other European countries,  
or because of certain institutional characteristics bearing on the mechanisms for adjusting to 
these shocks. In this respect, it is worth considering the characteristics of the ongoing 
correction of the excesses in the real estate sector, the labour market adjustment and the 
functioning of the competitiveness channel.  
The collapse in housing investment is an essential factor for understanding the 
dynamics and depth of the crisis. Investment in housing, which had expanded most sharply 
in the boom period, exceeding 12% of GDP, has seen its weight in GDP cut to less than 
7% in 2011. This is below its previous low and part of a trajectory that has probably not yet 
run its course.6 Indeed, the interaction of the slowdown in activity in the residential 
construction sector with the effects of the financial crisis prevented real estate excesses 
from being corrected more gradually. On the contrary, all the channels through which 
developments in the real estate sector spread to the rest of the economy were activated, 
contributing to amplifying the recession. The slowdown in household demand for housing in 
response to tighter financing conditions and to the downturn in confidence prompted a 
decline in housing starts and in residential construction, and a turnaround in house prices, 
which began to fall in 2008 Q2. The subsequent economy-wide reduction in output and 
employment coupled with the fall in real estate prices had a direct contractionary effect  
on disposable income and wealth. That triggered a series of second-round effects on 
residential investment, on activity in the sector and its ancillary industries, and, once more, 
on employment.7 
Further, the particular characteristics of the residential construction sector, which is 
strongly leveraged and where the housing production period is prolonged (no less than two 
years), meant that, in 2008 and 2009, housing started before the beginning of the crisis 
continued to be built and real estate firms took on heavy debt as the firms could not  
— following the usual cycle — free themselves of their financial burden through the sale of 
this real estate.8 As a result, a large stock of unsold housing emerged in those years, which 
depressed prices and erased prospects of a prompt recovery in the sector, leading to a 
collapse in the number of housing starts. These circumstances saw substantial increases in 
                                                                          
6 These figures correspond to data from the new National Accounts (base 2008) which, compared with the base 2000 
series, increase the weight of investment in housing in GDP by between 2 pp and 3 pp, given that they now include 
within this category the capital goods incorporated into a dwelling and the expenses linked to the purchase of a house 
formerly viewed as investment in other products, such as legal costs, architecture-related expenditure, engineering, and 
transfer tax.   
7 The description of the adjustment of the real estate sector and the relative significance of the various channels can be 
found in Marqués et al (2010). 
8 The fact that houses started before the collapse in demand continued to be built in the following years may have 
contributed to softening in some way the effect of the real estate crisis on economic activity, but at the expense of 
making the ensuing declines more prolonged, by having continued to increase the debt of real estate developers and by 
having depressed the outlook for the sector in the medium term, insofar as the supply overhang increased.   
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real estate company defaults and the bankruptcy of some, while certain banks' balance 
sheets were impaired. The adjustment of house prices is proving greater than that recorded in 
the cycles of the late 1970s and early 1990s. The strong volatility of residential investment 
and of house prices, along with the cyclical implications entailed, are key aspects for drawing 
lessons about the future, which are examined in section 4.  
The workings of the labour market are also an essential factor for understanding the 
dynamics and depth of the crisis. As indicated, the average level of compensation per 
employee has increased moderately since 2008; but behind this growth lies highly 
expansionary wage behaviour in the years in which economic activity most fell (2008-2009), 
with annual growth exceeding 5%, followed by practically zero increases, although the latter 
have come about owing to the reduction in public-sector wages. Yet over the same period, 
employment has declined by more than 2 million people and the number of unemployed has 
risen, placing the unemployment rate at over 21% at the close of 2011. As often reiterated9, 
the wider scale of the employment response in Spain, along with the more inertial behaviour 
of wages seen once again in this period, reflects a historical pattern underpinned by certain 
institutional characteristics of the labour market, such as the excessive difference in the 
degree of protection afforded to permanent and temporary contracts, and the scant 
adaptability of collective bargaining arrangements to economic circumstances, to firms' 
situation and to productivity gains.   
As is well known, the monetary union in Europe has a single monetary policy and 
currency, limits on fiscal policy discretion and frictions in the area-wide functioning of the 
factor and product markets. Against this background, adjustment channels must work 
efficiently to correct the potential disequilibria that may arise as a result of the misalignment 
of competitiveness or to absorb the emergence of shocks with the least possible upheaval. 
As earlier indicated, the Spanish external deficit had reached excessive levels in 2007 of 
close to 10% of GDP in the wake of the real estate boom and of the surge in corporate and 
household debt. In turn, national demand had come to account for almost 107% of GDP, 
meaning that net external demand detracted forcefully from growth and that there were 
highly significant domestic price strains. The pressing task of correcting this imbalance 
involved the immediate activation of the adjustment channel through which competitiveness 
operates. According to this, in a monetary union the countries with most inflation will 
undergo losses in competitiveness that ultimately reduce exports and increase import 
penetration. The subsequent decline in demand should exert downward pressure on prices 
and wages, which will promote the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, 
restoring the competitiveness lost. The effectiveness of this adjustment mechanism  
is obviously related to the flexibility of cost- and price-setting systems, which was  
— as mentioned — rather limited in Spain.   
Since 2007 the external deficit has been substantially corrected, with a significant 
rise in goods and services exports, the share of which in world markets has increased. The 
weight of national demand has fallen to 101% of GDP in 2011, meaning that the external 
balance of goods and services has almost moved into equilibrium.10 Nonetheless, this 
correction of the deficit has largely been based on the marked weakness of domestic 
                                                                          
9 See, inter alia, Estrada et al (2009), Cuadrado et al (2011) and Banco de España (2009). 
10 This is not the case for the balance of transfers or, above all, for the incomes balance, which shows a marked and 
increasingly negative sign, as a result of the accumulation of liabilities to the foreign sector.   
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demand and, therefore, of imports11, while the REER has depreciated only moderately and, 
moreover, has done so on the back of an acute adjustment in employment, which has led to 
an increase in apparent productivity. This improved productivity has not therefore been the 
result of a build-up in gains in productive efficiency, which is crucial for achieving lasting 
increases in competitiveness, in the broadest sense of the term. The overriding impression is 
that in Spain, as in other euro area countries, the adjustment channel operating on 
competitiveness has functioned only partially over these years.12 
                                                                          
11 The external goods and services deficit fell from 6.7% of GDP in 2007 to around 1% in 2011. Of this improvement, 
almost 60% was due to the decline in the weight of imports in GDP, and 40% to the increase in exports. 
12 Malo de Molina (2011b) points out that the malfunctioning of the competitiveness channel has indeed been one of the 
main weaknesses of the euro area from the outset.  
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4 Lessons from the crisis  
Sustainability of the external deficit in a monetary union 
Spain has persistently posted an external deficit of some size. This was due, at least in 
part, to the fact that the Spanish economy was less developed than its main European 
peers, which meant greater investment opportunities in the country (or a bigger return on 
such investment projects) and a shortfall in national saving to cover these investment 
possibilities. Yet at the same time, the external deficit was an expression of the economy’s 
inability to avail itself of a sufficient degree of macroeconomic stability, which led to a 
regular loss of competitiveness in upturns and to a widening of the external deficit, which 
had to be corrected with likewise regular devaluations of the peseta, the mechanism for 
temporarily re-balancing the external shortfall (see Chart 9).   
EMU membership in 1999 involved in this respect two fundamental elements. Firstly, 
Spain was joining a union with a single currency and fully liberalised capital movements, 
leading to anticipation that investment opportunities arising in Spain would be more readily 
taken advantage of through resort to external saving, since the euro would provide  
for confidence in the Spanish economy by eliminating the possibility of devaluation. The 
external constraint would not therefore be as demanding as when the peseta was in place, 
and nor would there be such an evident external deficit limit which, once exceeded, were to 
set in train speculative attacks or pressures on the national currency.13 Secondly, EMU 
membership removed the possibility of regularly correcting the country's competitive position 
through resort to devaluations. Accordingly, the financing of any future external deficits  
in Monetary Union would be more straightforward; but it had to be borne in mind that, if  
such deficits reached a high level, if competitiveness worsened substantially or if net external 
demand detracted significantly from growth, then the exchange rate could not be used as an 
instrument to swiftly improve the competitiveness of domestic production, to correct the 
external deficit and to promote export-led activity. The absence of this instrument would thus 
require flexible cost and price developments that were to ensure the competitiveness of 
domestic production.   
As the external imbalance progressively increased during the boom years, several 
reports and articles pointed out that the rising path of external debt was not sustainable. They 
likewise highlighted the problems that the real-terms appreciation was generating, the costs 
of correcting it in a monetary union and the heavy private-sector debt incurred, which 
reflected the intense resort to external saving.14 Emphasis was further placed on the need for 
early diagnosis and correction, given the perceived difficulties of reversing some of these 
imbalances within a monetary union. Other papers stressed the fact that only highly 
favourable expectations about future income growth could sustain the substantial increase in 
external debt, expectations that could hardly hold given that the build-up of imbalances in the 
Spanish economy was making the indefinite maintenance of strong growth unsustainable.15 
                                                                          
13 The economic literature and Spain's own experience when it had its own currency suggest that deficits above 3% or 4% 
of GDP mark the start of pressures to correct such deficits [see Freund (2000)]. 
14 See L’Hotellerie and Peñalosa (2006) and Malo de Molina (2006). 
15 See Campa and Gavilán (2006). 
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HISTORICAL PATH OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT AND OF THE REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE IN SPAIN (REER) CHART 9
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True, these considerations were present in the economic debate as from Spanish 
EMU membership. But the factor relating to the ease of financing external deficits in a 
monetary union was to some extent diminished by the absence of tensions on financial 
markets for a very lengthy period, which meant that the risks of that trajectory were 
underestimated. Nonetheless, subsequent events would show that the external constraint 
remained fully operative in EMU. The fact that the increase in the external deficit during the 
expansion was inextricably linked to the real estate boom and, in general, to the sharp 
increase in household and corporate debt is key to understanding this turnaround in the 
markets' perception of risk. Analysis of the breakdown of the nation's net borrowing in terms 
of the contribution of each institutional sector shows that the external deficit is basically due  
to the strong increase in the net borrowing of non-financial corporations and to the fact that  
the traditional creditor position of the household sector became a debtor position in the 
expansion years (see Chart 10). Admittedly, the role of the general government sector offset 
this to some extent, but insufficiently so to contain the external deficit and, as is analysed 
later, to ensure the sustainability of public finances when the extraordinary income 
underpinning that position petered out.  
While households and non-financial corporations were the two institutional sectors in 
which a clear net debtor position was generated, it was credit institutions, in turn, which acted 
as intermediaries to obtain the external financing covering the external imbalance. As a result, 
there was a strong increase in households' and corporations’ debt with Spanish credit 
institutions, while the latter resorted to external saving to finance it. The volume and speed of 
this process became notable, thereby substantially increasing the Spanish economy's 
vulnerability, especially if some event beyond the control of the authorities or of domestic 
agents were to affect the risk perception of the economy or its financial system.  
The global financial crisis, the real estate collapse in Spain, deteriorating fiscal 
positions and growth prospects, and, finally, the inadequacy of European governance to 
confront the severe difficulties that arose in several countries as the effects of the crisis 
spread all shaped a scenario in which high debt, both vis-à-vis the external sector and on the 
part of the national private sector vis-à-vis banks, emerged as a considerable source of risk. 
Indeed, a change in the means of financing the external deficit began to be seen from 2008, 
with the funds obtained through the sale of government securities and short-term funds 
accounting for a greater weight relative to the resources raised through the issuance of 
covered bonds and asset securitisations, which were predominant during the years of the 
economic expansion. In parallel, external financing moved on a progressively costlier 
trajectory which left Spain vulnerable to the gridlock in funding flows that would arise 
recurrently thereafter. In other euro area countries, the source of the tensions was more 
closely linked, at least initially, to doubts over the sustainability of public finances or to the 
relative strength of banking systems. But irrespective of the ultimate causes of  
the vulnerability, when the markets perceived the contradictions between high debt, the 
deteriorating growth outlook and the shortcomings in the euro area's institutional 
arrangements to withstand such a scenario, the sovereign debt crisis arose, whose final act 
has yet to be played out. 
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The upshot of all these developments was that country risk once more had a 
determining role on financial markets; instead of all the euro area economies being treated as 
regions of a single country, they are now considered as part of a not fully entrenched project 
with break-up risks, something which could not be foreseen in the expansion years. 
Consequently, the view that the external deficit had ceased to be relevant in a monetary 
union, since national economies could be considered as regions in the new monetary area, 
was now clearly questioned. Adding to that is the fact that the euro area did not have 
sufficiently powerful stabilising instruments, such as those existing in the United States, which 
range from a federal budget policy with inter-State income transfer mechanisms to far greater 
labour mobility within US territory. 
The scale of the external deficit overshoot in Spain during the expansion and the 
difficulty of reversing it within the Monetary Union validates the recommendations that had 
been pre-emptively formulated. To assume the constraints imposed by membership of a 
monetary union, which are a logical counterpoint to the enormous benefits accruing, it would 
firstly have been necessary to prevent such an acute deterioration in the external deficit and, 
secondly, to have greater leeway with which to manage domestically controlled economic 
policy instruments in the event of tensions or the risks of a crisis arising. A more restrictive 
fiscal policy and greater liberalisation of the goods and factor markets would have been of 
fundamental assistance in tackling the events unleashed by the crisis: on one hand, because 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Cumulative data to October.
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they would have reduced national demand pressures, leading to a more balanced foreign 
trade account, with lower price and wage increases, and more favourable developments in 
competitiveness; and on the other, because into the crisis the room for manoeuvre of fiscal 
policy would have been greater and market flexibility would have provided for a better 
response to recessionary pressures, with a greater price adjustment rather than a volume-
based adjustment, as was actually observed.16 
In order to rapidly improve competitiveness within a monetary union, it is necessary to go 
beyond mere price and cost stability. A significant adjustment of the REER is unavoidable. This 
aspect comes to the fore when seeing how, in its recent trajectory, the Spanish economy had only 
managed to bring its external balance into equilibrium following significant devaluations of the 
peseta. To prevent the adjustment within monetary union from falling predominantly on real 
variables, the excessive downward stickiness of nominal variables must be overcome and the 
competitive environment enhanced so as to promote genuine productivity gains.  
Looking ahead and judging by the events in recent years, the possibilities of 
situations of this type recurring have lessened considerably. First, because the financial 
markets are probably going to introduce, on a permanent basis, an element of discipline into 
economic policy conduct, discipline which was practically absent during the upturn. Second, 
because a procedure for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area has been 
included in European governance mechanisms; and here, the external deficit, price-
competitiveness indicators, the budget deficit and private-sector debt will play a key role. 
Finally, the mark the recent crisis in Spain has left, in the form of a burgeoning unemployment 
rate and a pressing need to resolve major imbalances, such as the fiscal deficit, should alter 
how we address future expansionary phases, paying greater heed to macroeconomic 
constraints and to the demands of forming part of a monetary union. 
The real estate market  
The weight in GDP of investment in construction in Spain increased from 15% in 1998 to 22% 
in 2007, but more than 70% of this increase was due to investment in housing. It is not easy 
to set a benchmark for the appropriate level of the housing investment/GDP ratio. In Spain, 
moreover, given the weight of the tourist sector and the frequent purchase of second homes 
by non-residents and nationals alike, the weight of residential construction might be 
somewhat higher than that of most of our European neighbours. Yet while the investment in 
housing/GDP ratio hovered around 6% in the euro area in the period 2000-2010, in Spain the 
related figure was double this in 2006 and 2007, when it stood above 12% of GDP. As 
analysed later, the excessive size of the real estate sector means that too large an amount of 
resources are being allocated to a relatively low-productivity activity, with the subsequent 
brake this entails on the expansion of total output. 
Investment in housing is traditionally the demand component that tends to generate 
the most pronounced cyclical oscillations, not only in Spain but also at the international 
level.17 In the United States, for example, Leamer (2007) estimated that most recessions 
                                                                          
16 Gavilán et al. (2011) estimate that supply-side and structural reform policies do not necessarily lead to a reduction in 
the external deficit; however, by improving the medium- and long-term growth outlook, they do reinforce the 
sustainability of the external position. 
17 Although the investment in construction aggregate follows a clear cyclical path, its public investment and business 
investment components have less of a propensity to show sizeable variability or movements that respond to price 
expectations, as partly occurs in the case of residential investment. Moreover, both public investment and investment in 
construction are essential components for the development of the economy's productive capital and have an 
appreciable effect on long-term productivity. Accordingly, it is important in the analysis of the weight of construction to 
determine how much is due to investment in housing and how much to these other two components.  
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originated in a collapse of the real estate market, which then spread to the rest of the 
economy. Two characteristics of the housing market are essential: investment in this market 
is susceptible to show most substantial changes, since market expectations (in prices and in 
activity) may exert a considerable influence on market dynamics. Furthermore, it is a most 
employment-intensive sector and is linked to other productive branches and to other 
economic decisions, meaning that, when it goes into crisis, it not only has very powerful direct 
effects but also drags down certain industrial and services branches, and adversely affects 
household spending decisions.18 
Adding to the volatility of residential investment, moreover, is the fact that crisis 
periods are usually more acute and briefer than expansion periods, which underscores 
the catalyst role of this investment component in recessions. In Spain's case, the weight 
of residential investment in GDP, which took 12 years to peak (in 2007), has needed only 
four years to return to its starting ratio (in 2011).19 This form of adjustment means that, in 
a short space of time, a large quantity of labour is driven out the market. And this, in the 
absence of buoyancy in other productive sectors, extensive labour market flexibility or a 
sufficient level of training on the part of the labour affected (pre-requisites which Spain 
clearly did not meet), gives rise unfailingly to a hike in the unemployment rate.20 At the 
same time, these periods of traumatic adjustment have most adverse financial 
consequences, in that residential construction is a highly credit-intensive activity. As 
Chart 10 shows, most of the considerable dynamism observed in private-sector debt in 
the expansion years is linked to the real estate sector: hence, lending to households for 
house purchases doubled as a percentage of GDP from 2000 to 2007, climbing from 
30% to over 60%, while credit for consumer goods purchases and for other purposes 
remained practically flat; in the case of non-financial corporations, it was financing for 
construction and real estate development activities that increased most markedly in this 
period, rising from somewhat over 10% of GDP in 2000 to above 40% in 2007. Following 
this build-up in debt, the private sector must now deleverage in what will foreseeably be 
a complex and prolonged process, and which will require achieving a less credit-
dependent economic growth pattern.21 
Admittedly, the depth of the current real estate crisis has been determined by the 
nature of the international crisis. This originated in the US housing market and spread through 
financial systems, which play a key role in underpinning residential activity and which today 
still face serious difficulties in the context of the euro area crisis. But, in any event, even in the 
absence of the severe international shock that broke in 2007, Spain would likely have 
ultimately undergone a real estate crisis, simply because the trajectory of prices and of real 
and financial resources concentrated in the sector was not sustainable. Once this dynamic 
has unwound, there is a risk that the excesses will be absorbed in a disorderly fashion, since 
this is a market where expectations, the behaviour of other agents and confidence play a vital 
role. And these latter variables are liable to change very quickly, triggering sharp movements 
in spending decisions and, in short, in the main macroeconomic variables, such as activity 
and employment.  
                                                                          
18 Álvarez and Cabrero (2010) address the influence of the real estate cycle on developments in the aggregate cycle. 
19 Regarding the status of the real estate sector adjustment at end-2010 and its macroeconomic implications, see Maza 
and Peñalosa (2010). 
20 For example, in the current crisis the countries that have posted a bigger increase in their unemployment rate are 
discernibly those that have had a real estate crisis. 
21 See Malo de Molina (2012). 
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In sum, events in this crisis show the key role the real estate market plays in 
generating macroeconomic imbalances. A more rigorous mortgage lending policy and the 
establishment of other macroprudential instruments that have been under discussion in 
various international fora in recent years22, or the use of the tax system to ensure neutral tax 
treatment when it comes to buying or renting housing, are just two examples of the 
instruments available to the authorities to restrict the expansionary dynamic of the real estate 
cycle. Along with these, and as was the case with the external deficit, measures to make the 
labour market more flexible would be beneficial, enabling the potential labour surpluses in one 
sector to be relocated with greater flexibility in others and having wages transmit a clearer 
signal of relative labour shortages or surpluses in different sectors. 
The role of fiscal policy 
The budgetary policy stance has shown a relatively high degree of synchrony in recent 
years across the European countries, with a markedly expansionary thrust in the early 
years of the crisis that turned contractionary as from 2010, once the sovereign debt crisis 
began in Europe. This should not, however, mask the fact that debate continues to 
surround the actual stabilising capacity of fiscal policy, a debate that has been rekindled 
owing to the scale the debt crisis has reached. Questions such as the size of the fiscal 
multipliers, the measures that boost the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy and the 
conditions under which fiscal consolidations are most successful, are not free from 
controversy.23 This debate is not addressed  in this section but, in light of the experience 
of recent years, an attempt is made to briefly review all the factors underlying the swift, 
sharp deterioration in Spain's fiscal position during the crisis years and the challenges 
posed by the consolidation under way. Ultimately the aim is to define to what extent the 
economic and financial crisis has changed the perception of the stabilising capacity of 
fiscal policy. To this end, some stylised facts on Spain's fiscal policy stance in the period 
2008-2011 are summarised hereafter.24 
Starting from a relatively comfortable budgetary position (Spain had a fiscal surplus 
of close to 2% of GDP and a public debt/GDP ratio of 36% in 2007), a series of discretionary, 
expansionary measures were adopted over the two years spanning 2007 and 2008 against a 
countercyclical fiscal policy background at the global level, promoted and supported by the 
international institutions in what was a coordinated response to the financial crisis.25  
A rapid and sharp deterioration in the budgetary situation ensued thereafter. The 
budget deficit rose by more than 13 pp of GDP to 11% in 2009, and the public debt ratio by 
18 pp to 54% of GDP that same year (see Chart 11). Overall, the fiscal deterioration was most 
acute and greater than anticipated, not only because the scale of the recession was greater 
than expected, but also because the extraordinary revenue to which the real estate boom had 
given rise disappeared. The increase in the debit position was chiefly structural, which raised 
the cyclically adjusted deficit to an unprecedented rate (almost 10% of GDP in 2009). 
                                                                          
22 See Malo de Molina (2011a). 
23 See, for example: IMF (2010), Banco de España (2011), Hernández de Cos and Moral (2011) and Rother et al. (2010).  
24 An exhaustive analysis of this issue can be found in Banco de España (2011). 
25 See Banco de España (2009). In the EU, the European Commission launched its European Economic Recovery Plan 
in December 2008. The Plan advocated the implementation of fiscal packages equivalent to 1 pp of GDP, through 
transitory measures aimed at boosting public investment in strategic industries. Both the IMF and the OECD called for 
the adoption of expansionary fiscal measures in their spring and summer 2008 reports. 
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The heightening of the sovereign debt crisis during 2010 and the emerging doubts 
over the sustainability of Spanish public finances made it necessary to bring forward and step 
up the fiscal consolidation process begun some months earlier. As a result, the budget deficit 
stood at 9.3% of GDP in 2010, meeting the objective set at the European level. A target of 
6% was set for 2011, although initial government estimates place the deficit at around 8%  
of GDP, which would entail a public debt ratio of over 70% of GDP, almost double that 
recorded four years earlier, and moving on a still-rising trajectory.  
Experience from past recessions in Spain suggested that a budgetary policy going 
beyond the use of the automatic stabilisers would ultimately bring about a rapid deterioration 
in the public finances position. In this respect, the deficit overshoot in recent years has 
revealed the existence of certain fragilities in institutional arrangements and of errors in the 
diagnosis of the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy. It would be worth considering these in 
order to prevent their future recurrence.    
Firstly, focusing on the diagnosis by international organisations of Europe's 
problems, at the onset of the crisis the room available to pursue countercyclical fiscal policies 
was overestimated. Generally, economic policy recommendations were not adjusted to  
the differences existing in underlying fiscal positions.26 Nor were potential differences in the 
channels through which the crisis spreads, and, therefore, in the scale and persistence of  
the contraction, taken into account. In Spain, a not-inconsiderable portion of the tax revenue 
raised in the expansion years was known to be due to the buoyancy of real estate activity, but 
it was difficult to estimate the scale of such revenue with the usual fiscal balance breakdown 
techniques.27 Indeed, the difficulty in accurately measuring the structural component of 
revenue led to the risks underlying the public finances position to be minimised, and limited 
the primary-expenditure-adjustment drive during the expansion years.  
Furthermore, the existing fiscal discipline frameworks have proven insufficient to 
ensure compliance with budgetary targets. European supervisory procedures were unable  
                                                                          
26 See Pisani-Ferry et al (2011). 
27 De Castro et al (2008) estimated that this extraordinary revenue had risen, in cumulative terms, to more than 2 pp of 
GDP to 2007. This was similar to the estimate in Martínez Mongay et al (2007).  
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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to promote any sustained consolidation of public finances during the expansion phase28, 
which it is hoped to redress with the recently approved reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and with the deeper-seated changes to be implemented through the Intergovernmental 
Treaty that will be approved in 2012. On the domestic front, the budgetary stability legislation 
was not effective either in alerting, foreseeing and preventing the magnitude of the fiscal 
deterioration, especially in the case of the regional governments. The monitoring and control 
mechanisms proved to be insufficiently binding. The recent inclusion in the Constitution of 
ceilings on the deficit and on public debt aim to resolve these problems looking ahead.29 
As to the stabilising potential of fiscal policy, although it is difficult to calibrate the 
macroeconomic effect of the fiscal packages implemented in the different phases, some 
analytical approaches appeared to indicate that they had a moderate countercyclical effect. 
During the crisis years, against the background of prevailing uncertainty, part of the 
expansionary impulse was contained in a higher household saving ratio or confined itself to 
altering the pattern of expenditure, without affecting its underlying trend.  
In any event, once very negative deficit positions have been reached, as was the 
case in Spain in 2009, the experience of recent years shows that the fiscal drive needed to 
resume healthy budgetary positions is on a most sizable scale, it feeds through only gradually 
to the deficit figures and it will be reflected with a much greater delay in the public debt 
figures. As indicated, Spain's budget deficit increased by 13 pp of GDP in only two years, 
while it is estimated that four years and a considerable consolidation drive will be needed to 
place the deficit at 3% of GDP in 2013. In the case of the debt ratio, the return to pre-crisis 
figures is not envisaged on the immediate horizon. And not only because of the lower 
foreseeable contribution of economic growth, but also because, as in the past, resort cannot 
be had either to a reduction in interest payments, which are moving on a clearly rising 
trajectory, or to the contribution of other sources of improvement, such as the extraordinary 
revenue from the past real estate boom.  
In short, the risks expected potentially to arise as a result of discretionary fiscal 
measures going beyond the mere operation of the stabilisers have materialised. As indicated 
at the time, measures of that type might exhaust ahead of time the fiscal room for manoeuvre 
available to tackle, where necessary, adverse cyclical situations. In the worst case, it was 
warned that it might even be necessary to pursue restrictive policies at the least appropriate 
cyclical juncture, as has actually occurred as a result of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.  
The labour market  
A review of the labour market situation in the years prior to the 2007 crisis breaking might 
suggest that the Spanish labour market had overcome some of the endemic problems 
marking its behaviour for decades: low participation levels, scant capacity to generate 
employment and difficulties in reducing the unemployment rate, in particular its structural 
component. 
Indeed, in 2007 both the participation rate and the employment rate stood at 
historical highs, while the unemployment rate was at a low.30 The high participation rate 
                                                                          
28 Malo de Molina (2011b).  
29 Hernández de Cos (2011) reviews the shortcomings in the institutional frameworks in place and assesses what the 
inclusion of the fiscal rule in the Constitution represents.  
30 Moreover, the traditional gap between the male and female unemployment rate, between different age groups and 
between groups with different levels of training had narrowed to practically non-existent levels. 
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reflected the massive inflow of immigrants as from the year 2000, and the marked increase in 
the female participation rate, which affected all ages and levels of educational attainment (see 
Chart 12). The strong demographic impulse the Spanish economy experienced over these 
years can be adequately illustrated with some figures on the change in the composition of the 
population. From 1999 to 2007, Spain's population increased by over 5 million, three-
quarters of whom were foreign immigrants, whereby the proportion of foreigners in the total 
population climbed from below 2% in 1999 to 10% in 2007. The surge in the employment 
rate (almost 20 pp up on 1995) was a result of the notable economic expansion in the 10 
previous years, led by activity in the construction sector and, to a lesser extent, by certain 
services activities. The simultaneous expansion of labour supply and demand prevented the 
emergence of bottlenecks in the labour market and was conducive to relatively moderate 
wage behaviour at the aggregate level. Nonetheless, the temporary employment rate still 
remained very high, as a result, on one hand, of the type of productive specialisation, highly 
intensive in construction and in relatively unskilled labour. But, on the other hand, it also 
evidenced the failure of successive attempts to promote permanent hiring. This type of 
productive specialisation, along with scant progress in the efficiency of productive processes, 
meant very moderate productivity gains.  
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On the whole, the labour market situation in the pre-crisis years was a very buoyant 
one. Also, wage behaviour was less distorted than in the past, owing to the dynamising effect 
exerted by new labour market entrants during the expansionary phase, who showed greater 
wage flexibility and higher regional and sectoral mobility, along with a more active stance in 
the face of job loss. But this pattern was not sustainable; as the collective bargaining and 
hiring systems had scarcely been altered, the emergence of new shocks would foreseeably 
lead to a recurrence of the type of labour market adjustment seen in the past, with the bulk of 
the adjustment falling on employment and, in particular, on temporary hires. And that would 
have serious consequences since, given the underlying real estate excesses, only a rapid 
adaptation of relative wages, blocked by the institutional framework in place, would have 
been able to bring about a reallocation of labour from the clearly oversized construction 
sector to alternative activities.  
(1) The contribution of labour supply has been approximated by adding the contributions of the working age population, the participation rate and hours worked per person.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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The experience of recent years has confirmed the factors of vulnerability underlying 
the functioning of the labour market. While the essentially endogenous nature of the changes 
observed, closely linked to the boom under way, had been anticipated, the buoyancy of 
employment during the upturn had led to an overestimation of the real improvement in its 
fundamentals and, in particular, of its adjustment capacity in the face of shocks. There were 
serious consequences to this mistaken perception. For one thing, the scale of the contraction 
in employment that might accompany the adjustment of the real estate sector was 
underestimated, regarding both the size of the cut in employment in the sector and the 
indirect effects that the cut could trigger. Likewise, the role that employment as a whole could 
play as an amplifier of the effects of the crisis might have been underestimated.  
But, above all, this view of the functioning of the labour market detracted from the 
importance of the need to see through the unfinished institutional and structural changes that 
smooth participation in EMU required. Even when the scale of the problem unfolding in terms 
of unemployment was evident, the aforementioned mistaken view led to a delay in 
acknowledging the need to adopt sufficiently ambitious measures. In June 2010 the first 
steps were taken to attempt to address the underlying problems, when a reform of hiring 
arrangements was approved, followed in July 2011 by that of collective bargaining. In both 
cases what were involved were partial reforms that have had a very limited impact, although 
their entry into force came about at a time the economic and financial climate was 
deteriorating notably. In any event, they illustrate the scant effectiveness of partial and 
fragmentary reforms. 
Compounding the labour market inefficiency problems have been changes in the 
pattern of behaviour of labour supply, which has clearly moved into a slowing phase and has 
seen its possibilities of future expansion reduced. This is largely due to the response to the 
cyclical change by immigration, the rate of increase in which has been drastically cut in recent 
years, to the point of declines in net migratory flows being recorded in 2011. Partly offsetting 
this effect, the participation rate of the over-45s has been perceptibly more resilient, as has 
that of women, unlike traditional patterns in the past. The upward course of the female labour 
force is, in any event, limited. The resulting picture is one in which the contribution of the 
labour supply in the long run will detract momentum from the increase in potential growth, a 
negative aspect which will compound the impact of the high rate of structural unemployment.  
Lastly, the abundant availability of unskilled labour during the expansion years helped 
entrench a pattern of productive specialisation that was very unbalanced and which, as 
indicated, would prove unsustainable. The development of this labour-intensive model of 
specialisation muffled the signals stemming from the far-reaching transformation of the 
productive structure at the global level and delayed the adjustments to processes required in 
an increasingly globalised and competitive world. As a result, the adjustment must now be 
greater and the possibility of restoring employment-generation levels similar to those before 
the crisis is more uncertain.   
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5 Conclusions  
The economic crisis affecting the industrialised countries in recent years has been singular 
given its intensity, complexity and the difficulties in overcoming it. This is the first crisis of size 
to affect Spain since it joined EMU and, therefore, it arose in a situation in which the scope of 
economic policy instruments had narrowed significantly. That said, membership of EMU  
— a strongly integrated area, both economically and financially — did provide a safety net. 
Nonetheless, it was not known how it would respond to potential internal or more global 
shocks. During its first 10 years of EMU membership, the Spanish economy had built up 
significant macroeconomic and financial imbalances in certain areas (the real estate market, 
excessive debt and a loss of competitiveness), all of which were closely interlinked and which 
were evidently factors of vulnerability. But in other areas it evidenced apparently sounder 
fundamentals (as in the case of the budgetary position and labour market situation) that might 
endow it with some resilience.  
Against this backdrop, the recession in the Spanish economy from 2008 to 2010 Q1 
was sharper than those in the mid-1970s and early 1990s, with a very marked adjustment in 
domestic demand, which was partly offset by a positive contribution of net external demand 
to GDP growth. On the supply side, the recession had a virulent impact on construction, but it 
also severely affected industrial activity. The losses in terms of employment approximately 
doubled those witnessed in previous recessions.   
A central aspect of the crisis is the Spanish economy’s difficulties in recovering, 
which are greater than those faced by other European countries or those recorded in Spain in 
previous recessions. Up to 2011 Q3, scarcely 20% of the fall-off in the level of production 
since 2007 had been recovered, while employment, which continues to retreat following 15 
quarters of declines, has lost about 10% of its early 2008 level. Set against this, the external 
deficit has undergone a drastic correction. Moreover, since last summer, prospects have 
turned down sharply and further declines in activity cannot be ruled out, although this is a 
more global phenomenon and one closely linked to the worsening sovereign debt crisis.   
In Spain, emergence from the recession is conditional upon the imbalances 
previously built up being absorbed and upon the virulence of the shocks. The adjustment of 
the real estate sector is ongoing and the deleveraging of households and firms is moving 
ahead, albeit slowly, in a financial environment severely affected by the sovereign debt crisis, 
which reflects, inter alia, shortcomings in the euro area’s initial institutional design. In addition, 
the adjustment of the Spanish economy continues to evidence a series of distinctive features 
— especially in price- and wage-setting — that reveal the insufficient adaptation of agents' 
behaviour to the macroeconomic stability EMU membership requires. Lastly, the need to 
redress the vulnerable public finances situation calls for ambitious fiscal consolidation plans, 
which also conditions the exit trajectory from the crisis. 
The Spanish economy’s experience over the past four years allows certain lessons to 
be drawn on the external sector, the real estate market, fiscal policy and the labour market. 
The external deficit is a variable of singular importance in a monetary union. The events of 
recent years show that the accumulation of excessive deficits will ultimately be punished by 
financial markets which, under certain circumstances, may re-establish country risk and,  
by this means, hamper the financing of deficits. And this all the more so if the external deficits 
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have largely been the consequence of a strong increase in private-sector debt geared 
essentially to residential investment, alongside persistent losses in competitiveness vis-à-vis 
the external sector. To cope with the limits imposed by membership of a monetary union, it 
would have been necessary during the expansionary phase to avoid such an acute 
deterioration in the external deficit. In this connection, a restrictive fiscal policy and greater 
liberalisation of goods and factor markets should have been pursued, thereby lessening 
demand pressures and allowing for a sharper adjustment of costs and prices. In the current 
circumstances a substantial competitive improvement is needed to accelerate and intensify 
the economy's reaction. Gradual and modest adjustments may prove insufficient, and there is 
a risk they will lead to a growth path persistently below potential.  
It has been verified that the strong volatility of residential investment and of house 
prices may, under certain circumstances, have highly adverse cyclical consequences; 
accordingly, to maintain a suitable degree of macroeconomic stability, developments in the 
real estate market and in the productive and financial resources earmarked for housing 
investment must be closely monitored, with the authorities using the instruments available to 
them to curb the expansionary dynamic of the residential cycle. The Spanish case reveals, 
moreover, the difficulties of digesting household and business deleveraging processes that 
are strongly linked to real estate activities. And the latter, in turn, have adverse effects on 
bank balance sheets and, in general, on the financing conditions under which the economy 
necessarily operates. 
As regards public finances, the experience in recent years has highlighted, first, the 
difficulty entailed in accurately determining their underlying situation (partly because of 
insufficient analytical tools, but also because of the influence of economic policy 
considerations); and, further, the failings in institutional monitoring and surveillance 
mechanisms both at the European and national levels. And this despite the fact that, in both 
cases, mechanisms were designed to provide fiscal buffers in boom periods that would allow 
the pursuit of countercyclical budgetary policies in recessionary phases. The changes to fiscal 
arrangements adopted in Spain in recent months and the amendment of the Stability and 
Growth Pact under way in Europe will correct these dysfunctions. In any event, the 
application of fiscal policies that go beyond the operation of the automatic stabilisers may 
ultimately prompt adverse effects, as has occurred in recent years, and the effort to turn 
around a negative fiscal trajectory will require a far-reaching budgetary drive that is all the 
greater the weaker the bases of growth should prove. 
Lastly, the labour market has responded with unprecedented intensity to the shocks 
affecting the Spanish economy in the past four years. The dynamism of employment in the 
boom years, buoyed by the feedback loop between the expansion in construction and 
immigration, had led to an overestimation of the improvement in the fundamentals underlying 
the functioning of the labour market and in its adjustability to the shocks; and, accordingly, the 
potential extent to which this could amplify the effects of the real estate crisis, first, and 
spread to the rest of the economy, subsequently, was underestimated. As a result, structural 
unemployment has reached very high levels. And it will be very difficult to absorb it in the 
coming years unless measures endowing the economy with greater flexibility are introduced, 
in such a way as to smooth the cross-sector reallocation of surplus resources. Participation 
levels have shown some downward stickiness over these past four years, especially among 
the elderly and women, running counter to the most habitual patterns in the past. That  
said, the demographic impulse shows signs of petering out, which in turn will have 
unfavourable effects on potential growth. 
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In sum, the Spanish economy faces an extremely complex task that requires, along 
with resolute measures in the European arena to push forward the reform of the institutional 
framework of Monetary Union and the design of crisis-management mechanisms, compliance 
with the unavoidable commitment to fiscal consolidation and the introduction of ambitious 
reforms on various fronts. This would allow, on one hand, confidence to be restored and, on 
the other, the economic adjustment to be accelerated, having the adjustment channeled 
more through changes in prices and costs, and minimising its impact on employment and 
activity. The long expansion until 2007, the severity of the crisis and the difficulties in kick-
starting the economy have left us several lessons. These warn, in particular, of the need to 
avoid complacency in economic policy management in boom phases and of the urgency of 
adapting the structure of the goods and factor markets and agents’ behaviour in Spain to the 
requirements a monetary union imposes. 
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